

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

DAVID MICHAEL HENSEL,  
71 S 6<sup>th</sup> St.  
Port Townsend, WA 98368

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
U.S. Attorney  
700 Stewart St., Ste 5220  
Seattle, WA 98101

Defendant,

NO. 2:93-CR-0196-1 ~~CR~~ RSL

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM  
RESTITUTION AND EXPIRED  
JUDGMENT LEIN

FILED  
LOGED  
RECEIVED

MAIL

FEB 11 2021

AT SEATTLE  
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
BY DEPUTY

I, David Hensel, Pro Se, come before the court requesting relief and the return of monies from the U.S. Attorney's office attempts at collection of restitution for the following reasons:

1. Sentencing for petitioner was prior to the effective date of Apr. 24, 1996 for 18 U.S.C. 3613 (b)
2. The original lien filed in or around October 1993 expired after 20 years without attempt for renewal by Respondent. Therefore, a second lien is not allowed.
3. The government does not have the authority to collect restitution from petitioner.
4. There is an ex post facto violation.
5. The return of any-and-all monies collected via garnishments, requested monthly payments, tax refunds, and by any other means since July 2018.

MOTION  
USDC#: 2:93-CR-0196-1  
Page 1 of 11

DAVID M. HENSEL  
PRO-SE LITIGANT  
MAILING ADDRESS: 71 S 6<sup>th</sup> ST,  
PORT TOWNSEND WA 98368  
TELEPHONE: 360-301-9012  
EMAIL: TRIEDLOSTFOUND@YAHOO.COM

### Jurisdiction

Petitioner was originally sentenced in this court and all appeals have been heard in this court.

### Procedural History

In 1993, when Petitioner was sentenced for armed bank robbery, he was ordered to pay approximately \$912,842.34 in restitution and sentenced to terms of 180 months incarceration and 5 years supervised release. At the time, restitution was authorized by the VWPA. 18 U.S.C. 3663(a)(1)(A) (providing that a district court "may order" a defendant make restitution to any victim of the offense of conviction). On or around March 16, 1998, petitioner's restitution was reduced to approximately \$250,350, including special assessment.

On or about August 23, 2018, the Seattle U.S. Attorney's office sent petitioner a letter stating that his account was delinquent and requested monthly payments in the amount of \$100 by the 15<sup>th</sup> of each month. On September 19, 2018, the respondent filed for garnishing petitioner's wages. Petitioner's appealed the garnishment and was denied.

### VWPA v. MVRA

In 1993, the VWPA provided that the government may enforce a restitution order "(A) in the manner provided for the collection and payment of fines in subchapter B of chapter 229 of this Title [18 U.S.C. 3613 (1993)]; or (B) in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action." 18 U.S.C. 3663(h) (1993). The 1993 version of 3613 (b) states that "[a] lien becomes unenforceable and

liability to pay a fine expires (1) twenty years after the entry of judgment; or (2) upon the death of the individual fined.” Congress has clearly stated that the MVRA only applies prospectively. Section 211 of the AEDPA (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act) states that the amendments made to the VWPA by the MVRA “shall, to the extent constitutionally permissible, be effective for sentencing proceedings in cases in which the defendant is *convicted* on or after the date of enactment of [the AEDPA].” Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 211, 110 Stat. at 1241 (Emphasis added) The AEDPA was enacted on April 24, 1996. Because Petitioner was convicted in 1993, he was not convicted on or after the enactment of the AEDPA. Most recently in *United States of America, plaintiff, v. Jermon Rodriguez Clark, defendant.*, (no. 2:94-cr-00001-03, 2020 wl 7364609, at \*2 (e.d. tex. Dec. 15, 2020)) it was decided “The plain language of the MVRA provides for its prospective application *only*, which precludes its retrospective application.” *Walker*, 698 F. App’x at 585 (“given Congress’s stated intent that the MVRA apply only to defendants convicted on or after 24 April 1996, the district court erred in applying retroactively a provision of the MVRA to [defendant’s] 1995 sentence.”); *Duke*, 739 F. App’x at 972 (“because [defendant] was convicted before April 24, 1996, the district court erred in applying the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.”) *United States v. Fuentes*, 107 F.3d 1515, 1527 n.20 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the MVRA does not apply to a defendant convicted before April 24, 1996). This express Congressional intent is a threshold matter that was never brought to the attention of the Ninth Circuit in *United States v. Blackwell*, 852 F. 3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) and *U.S. V. Richards* (472 Fed.Appx. 523, 9<sup>th</sup> Cir., 2012).

Additionally, “a court must ‘apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative

1 history to the contrary.’ *Bradley [v. School Bd. of Richmond]*, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S. Ct. 2006,  
2 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974)].” 968 F.2d 427, 432 (CA5 1992). *Landgraf v. USI Film Prod.*, 511  
3 U.S. 244, 249, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1488, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1994). In the 1994 amendment to the  
4 MVRA specifically States in the notes that it is to take affect April 24, 1996 which specifically  
5 gives direction for a beginning date to the amendment.

6  
7 Any conclusion that the MVRA “20 years after the release from imprisonment”  
8 amendment to § 3613(b) does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause is irrelevant because it  
9 assumes a premise that there was Congressional intent that the MVRA apply retroactively. To the  
10 contrary, and as the Eleventh Circuit acknowledges, the MVRA expressly requires that it apply to  
11 sentences for convictions on or after its enactment date in 1996. Supra. Congress could have  
12 addressed releases after 1996 that were based on sentencing before 1996, but it chose not to. This  
13 leaves its applicability to only convictions after 1996. Because Congress did not intend for the  
14 MVRA to apply to Petitioner’s 1993 conviction to begin with, any Ex Post Facto argument is  
15 misplaced regarding the MVRA which means the amendment expressly does not apply.  
16

17  
18  
19 **The lien against the defendant should be released because it acts as a**  
20 **civil judgment which expires after 20 years unless timely extended,**  
21 **and here the lien was imposed in 1993 and never extended.**

1 The U.S. Attorney's office did their job in 1993 when they filed a lien against petitioner  
2 (Exhibit A), as was their prerogative, under the VWPA at the time. Twenty years later, in 2013  
3 when the lien automatically expired, neither the financial institutions nor the U.S. Attorney's  
4 office pursued to have the lien extended prior to its expiration. Under some U.S. Codes, liens  
5 can be extended for another 20 years provided a request is made through the courts and is  
6 approved prior to the expiration date (28 U.S.C. 3201 (c)). Then again in August 2018, 5 years  
7 after the expiration of the first lien, the government placed a second lien against petitioner  
8 (Exhibit B).

9 Codes dealing with liens generally state that a lien may be placed against defendant in  
10 favor of the government. In some instances, as mentioned above, a lien can be extended an  
11 additional 20 years provided certain requirements are met. Nowhere does a code say a second lien  
12 can be imposed any time after a first lien had expired. This could be construed to border on  
13 double jeopardy.  
14

#### 15 Ex Post Facto

16 The Ex Post Facto argument has been argued quite a bit in the ninth circuit in relation to  
17 MVRA. Decisions generally have been decided that applying MVRA to the VWPA is not ex post  
18 facto but rather procedural since restitution was already ordered, and additional punishment is not  
19 being inflicted. However, there are a couple factors that have not been considered regarding this.  
20 The first is found in U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I, section 9, clause 3, Ex Post Facto Laws. It states  
21 "Retroactive applications of statutes are not always appropriate; indeed, statutes affecting  
22 substantive rights and liabilities are presumed to have only prospective effect absent clear  
23 statements by Congress to the contrary. U.S. v. Ettrick Wood Products, inc., W.D.Wis. 1988, 774  
24 F.Supp. 544, adopted in part 683 F.Supp. 1262." The second is found in United States v.

1 Norwood (819 Fed.Appx 124 footnote 1). There it says, "In Edwards, we held that applying the  
 2 MVRA's mandatory restitution scheme instead of the VWPA's discretionary restitution scheme  
 3 to a defendant who committed his crimes before the MVRA's effective date would constitute an  
 4 ex post facto violation because the MVRA "increased the punishment for [the defendant's]  
 5 crimes" by "alter[ing] his fiscal responsibility for {their} consequences." 162 F.3d at 89. The  
 6 same may be true here. Although applying the MVRA version of 3613(b) would not directly  
 7 increase the amount of Norwood's restitutionary liability, it would increase the duration of his  
 8 liability and thus, as a practical matter, might increase the amount that he ultimately must pay."  
 9 This falls in line with the judgement in petitioner's case (Exhibit C) wherein it says, "Additional  
 10 restitution payment are to be deducted defendant's inmate recovery payment program while  
 11 incarcerated, with the remaining balance to be paid within five years of defendant's incarceration,  
 12 in equal monthly installments, commencing 30 days after defendant's release from custody."  
 13 These are extremely specific instructions by the court which parallel the VWPA (as well as the  
 14 length of liens) that was in effect at the time. In the 1994 version of VWPA (18 U.S.C. 3613(b)  
 15 provides for a 20-year period of restitutionary liability running from "the entry of the judgement."  
 16 (emphasis added). Deviation from this would alter the courts order and alter petitioner's sentence  
 17 for restitution.  
 18

19  
 20 To conclude, pursuant to the VWPA, Petitioner's restitutionary liability period expired in  
 21 2013, 20 years from his 1993 conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613(b) (1993).

### 22 **Modified Restitution**

23 It could be argued that the modification of restitution in 1998 postdates the MVRA  
 24 amendment in 1996. However, the 1998 restitution modification was just that, a modification and



The government is doing its due diligence because it believes a debt is owed to them. A debt due to the government is outlined in H.R. REP. 101-736 and States:

“(3) ‘Debt’ means–

“(A) an amount owing to the United States on account of a direct loan, or loan insured or guaranteed, by the United States; or

“(B) an amount originally due the United States on account of a fee, duty, lease, rent, service, sale of real or personal property, overpayment, fine, assessment, penalty, restitution, damages, interest, tax, bail bond forfeiture, reimbursement, or recovery of a cost incurred by the United States;

and includes any amount due the United States for the benefit of an Indian tribe or individual Indian, but excludes any amount to which the United States is entitled under section 3011.

This makes sense while petitioner was incarcerated and under supervision since payments are generally funneled through the DOJ. At sentencing, petitioner was given a special assessment of \$350 (which is a debt owed to the government), restitution, and no fines (Exhibit D). The special assessment was due and paid soon after sentencing. The restitution part of sentencing was specifically payable to four separate financial institutions listing the amount owed to each and not due to the FDIC (Exhibit E). That makes this restitution order unlike, say, “federal tax indebtedness--which is owed to the government and which, when collected, is deposited in the Treasury--is a debt for purposes of the FDCPA.” See *Markham v. Fay*, 74 F.3d 1347, 1354 (1st Cir.1996). This was monies taken from private corporations, not insured under the FDIC, and therefore not a under the U.S. Attorney’s purview or “a debt for purposes of the FDCPA.” In *Geiger v. Federal Bureau of Prisons* (487 F. Supp. 2<sup>nd</sup> 1155, 9<sup>th</sup> Cir., 2007, footnote 7), they quote *United States v. Rostoff*, (164 F.3d 63, 69, 1st Cir.1999) wherein “[O]nly restitution debts owed to the United States may be collected via the FDCPA.” (emphasis in original). Any recovery of

1 restitution owed after release from supervised release need be taken by the victims (in this case  
 2 the financial institutions) and not the U.S. Attorney's office. In Exhibit C (page is titled  
 3 Restitution and Forfeiture) it lays out that petitioner was to make payments to the "United States  
 4 Attorney for transfer to the payee(s)." This specifically shows this is not a debt to the  
 5 government. Further down the page Judge Dimmick adds that "Additional restitution payments  
 6 are to be deducted defendant's inmate recovery payment program while incarcerated, with the  
 7 remaining balance to be paid within five years of defendant's incarceration, in equal monthly  
 8 installments, commencing 30 days after defendant's release from custody." The Judges' order  
 9 shows the U.S. Attorney's office involvement in collection of restitution in this case ended at the  
 10 end of petitioner's supervised release. This could be the reason collection efforts beyond 2013 did  
 11 not happen since they understood the restitutionary liability period to collect restitution ended at  
 12 the time petitioner was released from prison and as such inaccuracies in petitioner's financial  
 13 disclosure statement<sup>1</sup> was not followed up on.

### 14 Conclusion

15  
 16 In 1996 Congress had an opportunity to add restitution in the MVRA amendments  
 17 however chose not to do so until the 2016 amendment. Until 2016, 18 U.S.C. 3613 (b) did not  
 18 have a provision for the length of time restitution could be collected much less any verbiage as to  
 19 restitution. At that time of the new amendment, restitution was added specifically without any  
 20 notes as to its effective date. There are many statutes pertaining to ordering of and ways to collect

21  
 22 <sup>1</sup> The Financial Disclosure Statement was filled out and signed by petitioner on March 31, 2010 on general  
 23 instructions page, a full year before release from supervision, (signed and dated March 31, 2011 on page 18) the  
 24 probation office nor the U.S. Attorney's office had any interest in what transpired after petitioner's release.  
 Furthermore, the petitioner failed to sign and date four separate areas in the Financial Disclosure Statement located  
 on pages 16 and 17 and altered a time limit on page 18 from five years to five weeks. No action was taken by the  
 probation office nor from the U.S. Attorney's office to correct these errors indicating the end of petitioners  
 restitutionary liability period.



1 restitution, but, not until the "Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016" was there any language  
2 for time limits to collect restitution. It was nearly two years after that addition that the respondent  
3 requested payment from petitioner, five years after their last attempt for payment, and five years  
4 after the first lien had expired. This first lien was filed in or around October 1993 under the  
5 Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C. 3565) and was to last 20 years. The  
6 respondent did not file a request to the court to continue it and it expired. In 2018 another lien  
7 was filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C 3613 (c).


8  
9 If the MVRA is the controlling code in collecting restitution given under VWPA, then  
10 there is a clear contradiction. Under MVRA, a payment schedule is supposed to be set up by the  
11 District court. This did not happen in either court the petitioner was given restitution in. There  
12 was not any mention or inference to the MVRA during petitioners hearing in 1998 nor added to  
13 the restitution amendment. If the MVRA in the 9<sup>th</sup> circuit is just procedural to collect from  
14 defendants sentenced under VWPA, why did the government need to wait until 2018 to continue  
15 pursuing payment from petitioner?  
16

17 **Petitioner request to have all actions by the U.S. Attorney's against petitioner to**  
18 **cease immediately, remove all liens against him, and return all monies collected and taken**  
19 **from him since July 2018 returned to him, remove any-and-all liens, and cease any further**  
20 **actions against petitioner.**  
21

22  
23  
24 DATED this 9th day of February 2021.

25 MOTION  
USDC#: 2:93-CR-0196-1  
Page 10 of 11

DAVID M. HENSEL  
PRO-SE LITIGANT  
MAILING ADDRESS: 71 S 6<sup>TH</sup> ST,  
PORT TOWNSEND WA 98368  
TELEPHONE: 360-301-9012  
EMAIL: TRIEDLOSTFOUND@YAHOO.COM



David M Hensel

Pro-Se Litigant

Mailing Address: 71 S. 6<sup>th</sup> St

Port Townsend, WA 98368

Telephone: 360-301-9012

E-mail: [triedlostfound@yahoo.com](mailto:triedlostfound@yahoo.com)

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MOTION  
USDC#: 2:93-CR-0196-1  
Page 11 of 11

DAVID M. HENSEL  
PRO-SE LITIGANT  
MAILING ADDRESS: 71 S 6<sup>TH</sup> ST,  
PORT TOWNSEND WA 98368  
TELEPHONE: 360-301-9012  
EMAIL: [TRIEDLOSTFOUND@YAHOO.COM](mailto:TRIEDLOSTFOUND@YAHOO.COM)

365314

## DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NOTICE OF LIEN FOR FINE OR PENALTY  
IMPOSED PURSUANT TO THE  
CRIMINAL FINE ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1984

43 RECORDED BY S40  
For Optional Recording  
US. Dept. of Justice  
303 OCT 26 AM 10 07  
MARTY E. GABOURY  
JEFFERSON COUNTY AUDITOR

United States Attorney's Office for  
Western District of Washington

Serial Number  
9300570/01 DEPT

NOTICE is hereby given of a lien arising under the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C. §3565; repealed Nov. 1, 1987 but applicable to offenses committed on or after Jan. 1, 1985 and prior to Nov. 1, 1987) against the property of the defendant named below in favor of the United States. A judgment imposing the payment of a fine or penalty shall, upon the filing of a notice of lien in the manner in which a notice of tax lien would be filed under section 6323(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights of property belonging to the defendant for the amount of the fine or penalty, interest, costs, special assessments, and additional penalties that may accrue. For the purposes of any State or local law, a notice of lien for a judgment imposing a fine or penalty shall be considered a lien for taxes payable to the United States.

Name of Defendant HENSEL, David Michael

Residence 31 South 7th Street, Port Townsend, WA 98368

Amount of Fine or Penalty \$912,824.34

Court Imposing Judgment U.S. DISTRICT COURT, SEATTLE, WA.

Court Number CR93-0196

Date of the Entry of Judgment AUGUST 6, 1993

Rate of interest during period when payment is deferred by the Court: 18% per year. This fine or penalty is subject to additional interest at the rate of 1.5% per month of any amount past due, and to possible penalties equal to 25% of the amount past due, as provided by 18 U.S.C. §3565(c)(1) and (c)(2), respectively.

IMPORTANT RELEASE INFORMATION--With respect to the lien listed above, this notice shall operate as a certificate of release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3565(h) on AUGUST 6, 2013.

Place of Filing Jefferson County Recorder, Port Townsend, WA 98368

This notice was prepared and signed at U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE on this, the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ October, 1993.  
Signature

LIS WIEHL  
Assistant U. S. Attorney

3600 SEAFIRST 5TH AVENUE PLAZA  
SEATTLE, WA 98104

OCT 25 1993

365314

VR 434-540

RETURN TO: J. Marks, Financial Litigation Unit  
U.S. Attorney's Office  
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220  
Seattle, WA 98101-1271

**DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NOTICE OF LIEN FOR FINE AND/OR  
RESTITUTION IMPOSED PURSUANT TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH  
PENALTY ACT OF 1996**

NOTICE is hereby given of a lien against the property of the defendant named below. Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3613(c), a fine or an order of restitution imposed pursuant to the provisions of subchapter C of Chapter 227 is a lien in favor of the United States upon all property belonging to the person fined or ordered to pay restitution. Pursuant to § 3613(d), a notice of lien shall be considered a notice of lien for taxes for the purposes of any State or local law providing for the filing of a tax lien. The lien arises at the time of the entry of judgment and continues until the liability is satisfied, remitted, or set aside, or until it becomes unenforceable pursuant to § 3613(h).

NAME OF DEFENDANT: David Michael Hensel

AMOUNT OF FINE OR PENALTY: \$250,350.00  
(fine, restitution, special assessment plus penalties, interest, and costs, as applicable).

COURT IMPOSING JUDGMENT: United States District Court for the Western District of Washington

COURT NUMBER: 2:93-CR-0196-1 DATE OF ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT: March 16, 1998

RATE OF INTEREST DURING PERIOD WHEN PAYMENT IS DEFERRED BY COURT: Interest to be charged pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612. Rate of interest is 0%. If payment becomes past due, possible penalties totaling up to 25% of the principal amount past due may arise - 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

IMPORTANT RELEASE INFORMATION: With respect to the lien listed above, this notice shall operate as a certificate of release, and liability to pay shall terminate the later of twenty (20) years from the date of judgment, or twenty (20) years after the release from imprisonment, or upon the death of the individual fined, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3613(b).

PLACE OF FILING: Jefferson County Recorder, WA

This notice was prepared and signed at the United States Attorney's Office this 24th day of Aug., 2018.

  
KYLE A. FORSYTH  
Assistant United States Attorney, WSBA #34609

\* For more information about this lien, please call the Financial Litigation Unit of the United States Attorney's Office for the Western District of Washington at 206-553-1866.

Defendant: David Michael Hensel  
Case Number: CR93-0196D

Judgment--Page 6 of 8

EXHIBIT

C

## RESTITUTION AND FORFEITURE

### RESTITUTION

X The defendant shall make restitution to the following persons in the following amounts: \$912,824.34

Name of Payee

Amount of Restitution

SEE PAGE 7 OF THIS JUDGMENT FOR A LIST OF VICTIM BANKS OWED RESTITUTION.

Payments of restitution are to be made to:

X the United States Attorney for transfer to the payee(s).  
\_\_\_\_\_ the payee(s).

Restitution shall be paid:

\_\_\_\_\_ in full immediately.

\_\_\_\_\_ in full not later than \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_ in equal monthly installments over a period of \_\_\_\_\_ months. The first payment is due on the date of this judgment. Subsequent payments are due monthly thereafter.

XX in installments according to the following schedule of payments:  
The defendant shall pay total restitution in the amount of \$912,824.34 as directed by the Probation Office. The defendant shall pay \$109,000.00 in restitution within 180 days from the date of sentencing. The defendant shall pay one-third of the \$109,000.00 in restitution no later than sixty (60) days after sentencing, one-third no later than one hundred twenty (120) days after sentencing, and the balance no later than one hundred eighty (180) days after sentencing. Additional restitution payments are to be deducted defendant's inmate recovery payment program while incarcerated, with the remaining balance to be paid within five years of defendant's incarceration, in equal monthly installments, commencing 30 days after defendant's release from custody.

Any payment shall be divided proportionately among the payees named unless otherwise specified here.

### FORFEITURE

\_\_\_\_\_ The defendant is ordered to forfeit the following property to the United States:



EXHIBIT

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Western District of Washington

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V.

## JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

(For Offenses Committed On or After November 1, 1987)

FILED &  
LOGGEDENTERED  
RECEIVED

Case Number: CR93-0196D

DAVID MICHAEL HENSEL

(Name of Defendant)

AUG 6 1993

PETER OFFENBECHER

Defendant's Attorney

RECEIVED

AUG 06 1993

### THE DEFENDANT:

AT SEATTLE  
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
BY DEPUTY

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

X pleaded guilty to count(s) I - VII of the Information  
 — was found guilty on count(s) \_\_\_\_\_ after a  
 plea of not guilty.

Accordingly, the defendant is adjudged guilty of such count(s), which  
 involved the following offenses:

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Date Offense Concluded	Count Number(s)
-----------------	-------------------	---------------------------	--------------------

PLEASE SEE PAGE 2 OF THIS JUDGMENT FOR OFFENSE INFORMATION

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 8 of this  
 judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of  
 1984.

— The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s) \_\_\_\_\_  
 — Count(s) \_\_\_\_\_, and is discharged as to such count(s).  
 — \_\_\_\_\_ (is) (are) dismissed on the  
 motion of the United States.

X It is ordered that the defendant shall pay a special assessment of  
\$350.00, for count(s) I through VII  
 which shall be due X immediately \_\_\_\_\_ as follows:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United States  
 attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence,  
 or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special  
 assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid.

Defendant's Soc. Sec. No.:

Defendant's Date of Birth:

Defendant's Mailing address:

c/o Kent City Jail  
Kent, WA

I hereby certify that the  
 annexed instrument is a true  
 and correct copy of the original  
 and correct file in my office.

Defendant's Residence Address:

same

ATTEST: BRUCE RIFKIN

Clerk, U. S. District Court

Western District of Washington

By S. Lindberg  
Deputy Clerk

LIS WIEHL

Assistant United States Attorney

08-06-93

Date of Imposition of Sentence

Signature of Judicial Officer

CAROLYN R. DIMMICK

United States District Judge

Name &amp; Title of Judicial Officer

8-6-93

Date

29



Defendant: David Michael Hensel  
Case Number: CR93-01 JD

Judgment--Page 7 of 8

XH.B.T

E

Name of PayeeAmount of Restitution

Key Bank of Washington  
P.O. Box 11500 MS 8881  
Tacoma, WA 98411

\$252,402.00 (Counts I and III)

Key Bank of Washington  
P.O. Box 11500 MS 8881  
Tacoma, WA 98411

\$423,770.00 (Counts IV and VI)

Seafirst Corporate Security  
P.O. Box 3586 - Suite 2424  
Seattle, WA 98124-2477

\$236,200.00 (Count V)

Washington Mutual Savings and Loan  
1201 Third Ave.  
Seattle, WA 98101  
Attn: Corporate Security

\$452.34 (Count VII)

\*\* Date and location of robbery must be noted on money order or cashiers check.


GRAND TOTAL - \$912,824.34

X

2:93-CR-0196-1

**Proof of Service**

I, David M Hensel, do solemnly swear, that on February 9, 2021, I mailed a complete copy of my "MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM RESTITUTION AND EXPIRED JUDGEMENT LIEN" to the U.S. Attorney's office located at 700 Stewart St., Ste 5220 Seattle, WA 98101 via United States Postal Service, certified with return receipt for delivery.



FEB 11 2021

AT SEATTLE  
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
BY DEPUTY


Date: February 9, 2021

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David M Hensel", written over a horizontal line.

David M Hensel  
71 S 6<sup>th</sup> St  
Port Townsend, WA 98368  
360-301-9012  
triedlostfound@yahoo.com

David Hansen  
15.6th St  
Tombstone WA 98368

U.S. District Court Clerk's Office  
700 STEWART ST  
Suite 2310  
SEATTLE WA 98101




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AT SEATTLE  
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
DEPUTY





David Hensel  
21 S. 6th St  
Port Townsend WA 98368



U.S. District Court Clerk's Office  
700 STEWART ST  
Suite 2310  
SEATTLE WA 98101

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